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READING TAYLOR’S TEA LEAVES:
THE FUTURE OF QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
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ABSTRACT
Many observers of qualified immunity doctrine drew a sharp breath
when the Supreme Court handed down Taylor v. Riojas in late 2020. The
decision, reversing a grant of qualified immunity to prison officials sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, reflected a marked break in outcome and tone
from the preceding decade of unwavering commitment by the Court to
expanding the scope of qualified immunity’s protection to sued officials:
it was a nearly unheard-of victory for a plaintiff, and it was delivered in
an opinion that cautioned against applying qualified immunity’s
“clearly-established-law” prong in a manner too protective of officials,
rather than the opposite. The decision has prompted speculation among
commentators as well as lower courts about the degree to and manner in
which Taylor represents a shift in qualified immunity doctrine.
This Article considers that question, but does so through the lens of
not only the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence, but also the work
of lower federal courts before and after Taylor. The Article posits that
appreciating the full range of possibilities for qualified immunity’s postTaylor future requires engagement with the non-trivial degree of
hybridity among circuits in the stringency of qualified immunity,
mediated by not only the variety of approaches to analyzing the
substantive merits of qualified immunity claims, but also an array of
procedural rules that feature in qualified immunity litigation. Against
that backdrop, the Article sketches three plausible futures that might
emerge in Taylor’s aftermath. In the least earth-shaking scenario, Taylor
might be a one-off, an exceptional case that only serves to illustrate the
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muscularity of qualified immunity. A more far-reaching possibility is that
Taylor signals a softening of the Court’s clearly-established law test,
which could be accomplished through a variety of mechanisms—from
adjusting the level of particularity required by the clearly-established-law
inquiry, to less obvious means like tinkering with the legal sources
eligible to clearly establish the law. Finally, a more far-reaching though
less-determinate prediction is that Taylor might prompt greater
experimentation with procedural rules—such as restrictions on
interlocutory appeals, or limitations on pre-discovery dismissals—that
might diminish the qualified immunity’s effects on constitutional
litigation. To be sure, the Article does not offer odds on the accuracy of
any one of those three possible predictions. Rather, the aim is to
demonstrate the degree of hybridity that qualified immunity has featured
and will continue to feature—perhaps to a greater degree—as the lower
federal courts continue to be the primary interpreters and implementors
of the doctrine. The analysis thus exposes qualified immunity as an
important arena for considering the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts, and, more practically, shines light on
the array of doctrinal tools (often less visible in analyses that exclusively
center the Court’s work) that those wishing to reform qualified immunity
might add to their toolboxes.
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INTRODUCTION
There are few contemporary legal doctrines on which the Supreme
Court has lavished more attention than qualified immunity, the muchcriticized judge-made limitation on the availability of causes of action
against state and federal officials for violations of constitutional rights.1
The doctrine debuted as a narrow defense of common law origin for
local police officers sued for federal civil rights violations that were
analogous to the tort of false arrest.2 Before long, however, before
qualified immunity ballooned into a general defense of good faith
enjoyed by all officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the implied right
of action known as Bivens, and then was expanded and reinvented, in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, as an objective assessment of whether an official’s
constitutional violation transgressed “clearly established” law.3 In the
1. For recent and influential academic criticism see, for example, William Baude, Is
Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified
Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails];
Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(2015) [hereinafter Nielson & Walker, New Qualified Immunity]; Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Police Indemnification].
Defenses of the doctrine can be found, but they are mostly tepid. See Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1853 (2018) [hereinafter Nielson & Walker, Qualified Defense] (determining that characterization
of qualified immunity as unlawful and ineffective does not settle doctrine as a policy matter but
recognizing that improvements are needed); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for
Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 256 (2013) (conceding that some form of immunity is
sensible but criticizing scope of modern doctrine). But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Defending
Qualified Immunity, 72 S.C. L. REV. 547 (2020) (agreeing with critics that the doctrine’s
conventional justifications are unpersuasive but defending qualified immunity as preventing
diversion of taxpayer resources to unmeritorious litigation). For statements of discontent from
the bench, see, for example, Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1852 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (“I have previously expressed my doubts about our qualified
immunity jurisprudence. . . . Because our § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine appears to stray
from the statutory text, I would grant this petition [to reconsider qualified immunity].”); Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that decision “tells
officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable
conduct will go unpunished.”); Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479–81 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 110 (2020) (Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“restat[ing] . . .
unease with the real-world functioning of modern immunity practice” and citing Baude and
Schwartz, among others); Spainhoward v. White Cnty., 421 F. Supp. 3d 524, 540 n.10 (M.D. Tenn.
2019) (granting qualified immunity but “acknowledg[ing] that qualified immunity is a
controversial doctrine that can (1) lead to the head-scratching and frustrating outcome of a ‘right’
becoming ‘clearly established’ at the pleasure and indeterminate speed of various jurists, and (2)
undercut some of the core purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
2. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (holding that “the defense of good faith and
probable cause, . . . available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and
imprisonment, is also available . . . in the action under § 1983”).
3. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 818 (1982) (announcing “adjustment” to
good faith defense for Bivens and Section 1983 actions and holding that “government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
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decades since Harlow, the Court has regularly tinkered with all manner
of the procedure and substance of litigating qualified immunity, but its
most notable preoccupation has been with the stringency of that
clearly-established-law test. The Court’s decisions in recent years have
emphasized that to clear the hurdle of a qualified immunity defense,
plaintiffs must identify prior cases so factually analogous that “every
reasonable official” would recognize the illegality of their conduct.4
Reliance on general principles of law proscribing official conduct, such
as the rule that the Fourth Amendment bars police from using
objectively unreasonable force, will not suffice to prevail in a lawsuit
“outside an obvious case.”5
Conspicuously, no such “obvious” case arose on the Court’s docket
for twenty-five years after it created the category in its 2002 decision in
Hope v. Pelzer.6 Rather, the Court’s decisions in this period seemed
designed—in their volume, style, and outcome—to take back the
suggestion that such a case might exist. The Court devoted an outsized
proportion of its small docket to cases asking whether lower courts
correctly applied the clearly-established-law test when denying
qualified immunity, unfailingly reversing those denials for having
applied prior precedent in insufficiently factually particularized
fashion.7 Its opinions in those decisions frequently came in the form of
unsigned, summary orders–the judicial equivalent of a backhanded
slap–and took circuits to task (by name) for repeated intransigence.8 As
William Baude has written, “lower courts that follow Supreme Court
doctrine should get the message: think twice before allowing a

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known”).
4. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also Baude, supra note 1, at 81
(discussing Court’s steady “tinker[ing]” with the doctrine); Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified
Immunity and Federalism All the Way Down, 109 GEO. L.J. 305, 327–28 (2020) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and Federalism] (discussing subtle but important shift from “a
reasonable official” to “every reasonable official” in Court’s formulation of clearly-establishedlaw test) (emphasis omitted).
5. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)).
6. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
7. See Baude, supra note 1, at 82–85 (discussing directionality and volume of the Court’s
qualified immunity docket).
8. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (“We have repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in
particular, . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”); Cole v. Carson,
935 F.3d 444, 473 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Ho & Oldham, JJ., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court
has not hesitated to redress . . . intransigence from our sister circuits—often through the
‘extraordinary remedy of a summary reversal.’” (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162
(2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting))).
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government official to be sued for unconstitutional conduct.”9 Justice
Sotomayor has been more pointed in her depiction of the Court’s work
product, writing in dissent that the Court’s “one-sided approach to
qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for
law enforcement officers” and “tells officers that they can shoot first
and think later, and . . . the public that palpably unreasonable conduct
will go unpunished.”10
The upshot of the Court’s recent qualified immunity jurisprudence–
and its clearly-established-law decisions in particular –is a body of
opinions that broadcast that the open-textured standard of “clearly
established law” is to be applied with maximal deference to officials;
only the “plainly incompetent” or those who “knowingly violate the
law” should escape the protection of immunity.11 Judges have heard the
message “loud and clear,” in the words of the oft-scolded Ninth
Circuit.12 Thus, the Court’s contemporary qualified immunity
jurisprudence has been received not just as individual holdings and
formal statements defining the doctrine’s contours, but collectively as
a directive to lower courts about how the doctrine should be applied.
In this sense, the Court’s clearly-established-law rulings of the past
decade have been quintessential examples of what Professor Richard
Re has called “signaling”—transmission via the Court’s adjudicatory
work product of non-precedential directions to lower courts about how
precedent is to be applied.13
Hence, in November of 2020 when the Court handed down Taylor
v. Riojas, reversing the Fifth Circuit’s grant of qualified immunity to a
prison official, it introduced a measure of jurisprudential noise.14 Issued
as yet another unsigned summary order—but in a radically different
register from the Court’s recent decisions—the opinion marked the
first time in nearly twenty years that the Court rejected an official’s
claim of immunity and found that the plaintiff had successfully
9. Baude, supra note 1, at 84.
10. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162.
11. Id. at 1152 (majority opinion).
12. S.B. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Morrow v.
Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The second question—whether the officer violated
clearly established law—is a doozy. . . . The pages of the United States Reports teem with warnings
about the difficulty of placing a question beyond debate. From them, we can distill four applicable
commandments.”).
13. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921,
942 (2016) (discussing Supreme Court practice of using “signals” to guide lower courts in how
precedents should be applied).
14. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (per curiam).
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demonstrated that prior law clearly established that the defendant’s
alleged conduct violated the Constitution. The Court’s reasoning was
even more noteworthy. Citing none of the rulings of recent years that
emphasized courts’ obligation to identify factually analogous cases, the
Court instead cited its long-neglected decision in Hope v. Pelzer.15 In
that case, the Court cautioned against an unduly restrictive
conceptualization of clearly established law and stated that “officials
can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in
novel factual circumstances.”16 Taylor invoked Hope in concluding that
“no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded” the
defendant’s conduct was “constitutionally permissible,” quoting the
case for the proposition that “‘a general constitutional rule already
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the
specific conduct in question.’”17 The Court would go on later in the
2020 Term to again vacate and remand the Fifth Circuit’s grant of
qualified immunity in McCoy v. Alamu, ordering (in what is often
termed a “GVR” for “grant, vacate, and remand”) that it be given
“further consideration in light of Taylor v. Riojas” —a move that some
observers have taken to indicate that Taylor is no fluke, but rather the
harbinger of some shift in the Court’s approach to qualified immunity.18
As stark a departure as Taylor’s tone is from the qualified immunity
decisions that preceded it, the case’s significance is far from “loud and
clear.”19 That much is evident from the diversity of views already
apparent among the lower federal courts seeking to faithfully apply the
Court’s teachings in Taylor’s aftermath. Some have characterized
Taylor as a substantial course-correction by the Court, an invitation to
lower courts to more freely consider whether general constitutional

15. Id. at 53-54.
16. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
17. Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
18. McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364 (mem.) (2021); Colin Miller, The End of Comparative
Qualified Immunity, 99 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 217, 224 (2021) (“[C]omparative qualified
immunity analysis might have met its end in the Supreme Court’s summary disposition in McCoy
v. Alamu . . . . significantly shr[inking] the qualified immunity defense and expand[ing] the
constellation of cases in which citizens can vindicate violations of their constitutional rights.”);
Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, supra note 4, at 351 (“The Court’s decision in
Taylor sends the signal to lower courts that they can deny qualified immunity without a prior case
on point—a very different message than the Court has sent in its recent qualified immunity
decisions.”).
19. S.B. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017); As one district court has
lamented in Taylor’s aftermath, “The Court does its best follow diligently and faithfully the
unwritten signals of superior courts, but, here, the signals are not clear.” Ortiz v. New Mexico,
No. CIV 18-0028 JB/LF, 2021 WL 3115577, at *79 (D.N.M. Jul. 22, 2021).
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principles can clearly establish the illegality of an official’s conduct.20
At the other end of the spectrum, some lower courts have read the
unusual and extreme facts of Taylor as simply reinforcing the Court’s
old message that granting qualified immunity should be the rule rather
than the exception.21 Others have offered that the truth about what the
future holds for qualified immunity and clearly-established-law
analysis is likely somewhere in between.22
Focusing exclusively on the Supreme Court and the meaning of its
revivification of Hope, however, fails to account for important (though
often ignored) variations among lower courts’ deployment of
substantive and procedural rules that attend adjudication of qualified
immunity–rules that will likely affect and be affected by their receipt of
Taylor’s signal.23 For example, the circuits vary on the sources that can
be relied upon to “clearly establish” an official’s legal obligations, with
some taking a parsimonious view (e.g., only Supreme Court and incircuit precedents) and others a more ecumenical one (e.g., examining
state court and federal district court opinions, or even non-judicial
sources such as training materials).24 The circuits also vary in their
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See Katherine Mims Crocker, The Supreme Court’s Reticent Qualified Immunity
Retreat 71 Duke L.J. Online 1, 7—12 (concluding there is “ample cause to doubt
that Taylor and McCoy signify a sharp shift in the Court’s overall attitude about constitutional
enforcement” and also that Taylor likely signals more than merely a statement that “some space
still exists between qualified and absolute immunity”).
23. Professor Joanna Schwartz has made a similar point in her work examining how “civil
rights ecosystems” shape the impact of qualified immunity, although her focus is far broader than
simply doctrinal variation among circuits. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights
Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1539 (2020) [hereinafter, Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems].
While the light this Article shines is far narrower, it is also for that reason more granular and adds
to a literature on lower court qualified immunity jurisprudence that has been nearly exclusively
focused on the stringency of clearly-established-law tests and variability in excessive force
doctrine. See id. at 1551 n.44 (citing “scholarship examining variation in courts’ interpretations of
constitutional rights, qualified immunity, and municipal liability”). An exception to that rule is
the work of Professors Chris Walker and Aaron Nielson, whose empirical study revealed
important variation in lower courts’ tendencies to decide, or skip, consideration of whether a
constitutional violation was committed before considering whether the law was clearly
established—discretion which lower courts have enjoyed since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Pearson v. Callahan. See Nielson & Walker, New Qualified Immunity, supra note 1, at 39 (finding
“substantial variation in the rate at which the circuits decide to exercise their Pearson discretion
to reach constitutional questions, with the Fifth Circuit leading the way in exercising discretion
57.6% of the time, compared with 47.7% for the Sixth Circuit and 36.0% for the Ninth Circuit.”).
24. Compare Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1015 (10th Cir. 2021) (“[J]udicial decisions are
the only valid interpretive source of the content of clearly established law, and, consequently,
whatever training the officers received concerning the nature of Mr. Frasier’s First Amendment
rights was irrelevant to the clearly-established-law inquiry.”), and Carollo v. Boria, 833 F.3d 1322,
1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (case on point from Supreme Court, circuit, or state’s highest court is
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willingness to grant qualified immunity prior to discovery, and in their
solicitude toward interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials.25
These variations, in turn, can significantly alter the power of qualified
immunity, affecting the odds that a plaintiff can overcome the defense,
or at least endure the course of civil litigation for sufficient time to have
a chance at favorable settlement. Given this array of levers for
enhancing or mitigating qualified immunity’s curtailment of litigation,
a downward shift in the Court’s general solicitude toward qualified
immunity might trigger not only changes in lower courts’ analyses of
clearly established law, but also broader adoption of other rules that
diminish qualified immunity’s bite.
This Article will sketch three plausible futures that might emerge in
Taylor’s aftermath, all of which find some support in lower courts’
interpretations of Taylor and the Supreme Court’s own post-Taylor
rulings. In the least earth-shaking scenario, Taylor might be a one-off,
an exceptional case that only serves to illustrate the muscularity of
qualified immunity. A viable prediction with more far-reaching effects
would be that Taylor signals a softening of the Court’s clearlyestablished law test, though perhaps only in the context of particular
rights claims (portending a less trans-substantive future for the
doctrine). Notably, however, I argue that a number of under-examined
mechanisms exist for lower courts to accomplish that softening, from
tinkering with the legal sources eligible to clearly establish the law, to
shifting rules about how circuit splits are treated in the analysis. Indeed,
Taylor may finally tee up the Supreme Court’s opportunity to provide
guidance concerning some of these less-visible, but important details of
the clearly established law inquiry. Finally, a prediction at once farreaching and indeterminate is that the Supreme Court is signaling that
it will tolerate experimentation in the interstices of the Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence beyond mere application of the
required to clearly establish law), with Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165–66 (3d Cir.
2021) (stating that clearly-established inquiry looks to Supreme Court precedent, circuit
precedent, out-of-circuit cases, and “district court cases, from within the Third Circuit or
elsewhere”), and Irish v. Maine, 849 F.3d 521, 527–28 (1st Cir. 2017) (discussing relevance of
training in evaluating qualified immunity).
25. See, e.g., Estate of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 737 (9th Cir. 2021) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (noting variation in how circuits have applied Court’s collateral order doctrine with
respect to qualified immunity); Estate of Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 111
(2d Cir. 2020) (stating presumption against 12(b)(6) dismissal on qualified immunity grounds and
concluding that “advancing qualified immunity as grounds for a motion to dismiss is almost always
a procedural mismatch”); Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is generally
inappropriate for a district court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified
immunity.”).
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clearly-established law test, in ways that might diminish the doctrine’s
effects on constitutional litigation.
The aim here is not to take and defend a conclusive position on
Taylor’s holding. This Article takes as a given that the opinion in Taylor
is susceptible of a range of plausible interpretations; this is particularly
so when Taylor is read together with McCoy and against the backdrop
of the doctrinal arc of Supreme Court and, critically, lower federal court
cases that precede it.26 It may even be that Taylor’s brevity and
McCoy’s substantive silence reflect that the Court itself is undecided as
to where the doctrine is headed.27 Nor does this Article seek to predict
which one of several futures for qualified immunity will materialize. To
the contrary, part of the upshot of parsing a range of potential futures
for qualified immunity is to demonstrate that, at least in the short- to
medium-run, qualified immunity doctrine across the many federal
courts will have a non-trivial degree of hybridity. At the same time, the
analysis makes clear that this is nothing new. Thus, a second
contribution of this Article is to shine a light on the perhaps underappreciated variegation of qualified immunity doctrine, visible only
once oft-ignored dynamics of lower court interpretation are
illuminated.28
Recognizing qualified immunity’s hybridity has purchase beyond
the confines of predicting the trajectory of doctrine. Longstanding
criticism of qualified immunity has recently coalesced in concerted
campaigns for judicial and legislative reform, particularly with the
groundswell of policing and racial justice protests in the summer of
2020, but these efforts have yielded uneven results.29 A broad coalition
of advocates has steered cases to the Court to invite judicial

26. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 124–25 (1997) (noting “that a broad ambit frequently exists
for reasonable disagreement about how precedents are best interpreted and tests best applied”).
27. See Tara Leigh Grove, Sacrificing Legitimacy in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 121 Colum. L.
Rev. 1555, 1589 & n.203 (2021) (observing that “the Justices may decline review or opt for narrow
or open-ended doctrines for any number of reasons, including the difficulty of reaching agreement
on a multimember Court”).
28. For other work taking interest in lower federal court jurisprudence and the complex
dynamics of its interaction with (as opposed to mechanical deference to) the Supreme Court, see
generally id.; Re, supra note 13; Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The ForwardLooking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994).
29. See Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point
TIMES
(Jun.
23,
2020),
Amid
Protests,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-immunity.html (noting that “qualified
immunity has emerged as a flash point in the protests spurred by [George] Floyd’s killing and
galvanized calls for police reform,” and detailing reform proposals as well as opposition).
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reconsideration of the doctrine—an invitation that the Court has
pointedly refused.30 Congressional legislation to amend § 1983 to bar
the defense for law enforcement defendants remains pending, though
prospects for its passage now appear dim.31 States and localities
considered and in some instances passed legislation representing
various approaches to allow plaintiffs to bypass the doctrine, but the
vast majority of state-level efforts to legislatively eliminate immunity
were defeated.32 In a moment when we are seeing significant reform
energy but also substantial resistance to outright abolition of qualified
immunity, this Article’s illumination of the variety of tools that
effectively cabin the doctrine’s effects can offer something of a reform
menu to scholars, jurists, and advocates who wish to see official
immunity diminished.33
Part I of this Article briefly traces the contemporary evolution of
qualified immunity doctrine with a focus on the clearly-established-law
test, and then turns to the Court’s decisions in Taylor and McCoy to
demonstrate the magnitude of tonal shift that the Taylor decision
reflects. Part II takes up the task of sketching possible post-Taylor
futures, attending to the groundwork that the lower federal courts have
done to enable any of the possible scenarios to take root. The Article
concludes by reflecting on the implications of Taylor and its aftermath
for current debates over the future of qualified immunity.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED LAW

This Part briefly sketches the story of the clearly-established-law

30. See Jay Schweikert, The Supreme Court’s Dereliction of Duty on Qualified Immunity,
CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG (Jun. 15, 2020, 11:27 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-courtsdereliction-duty-qualified-immunity (discussing multiple petitions for certiorari filed inviting
Court action).
31. See Kiara Alfonseca, More Than a Year After George Floyd’s Killing, Congress Can’t
NEWS
(Sept.
23,
2021,
3:59
PM),
Agree
on
Police
Reform,
ABC
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/year-george-floyds-killing-congress-agree-policereform/story?id=80188065 (reporting that bipartisan discussions over George Floyd Justice in
Policing Act are “officially over”).
32. See Kimberly Kindy, Dozens of States Have Tried to End Qualified Immunity. Police
Officers and Unions Helped Beat Nearly Every Bill, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/qualified-immunity-police-lobbying-statelegislatures/2021/10/06/60e546bc-0cdf-11ec-aea1-42a8138f132a_story.html (“At least 35 state
qualified-immunity bills have died in the past 18 months . . . . The efforts failed amid multifaceted
lobbying campaigns by police officers and their unions targeting legislators, many of whom feared
public backlash if the dire predictions by police came true.”).

LAURIN_3.27.22 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

READING TAYLOR’S TEA LEAVES

4/20/2022 8:36 PM

251

test’s creation and evolution. It describes a period, marked by the
Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, when the Court’s decisions
cautioned against an overly stringent conception of how clear prior law
must be to place officers on notice of the illegality of their conduct for
purposes of overcoming qualified immunity. It then describes the
Court’s pivot away from Hope to a conception of qualified immunity
that appeared to free officials entirely of the burden of extrapolating
from prior court decisions to the facts before them, reflected in the
Court’s last decade of qualified immunity jurisprudence. Against this
backdrop, the Part details the Court’s analysis in Taylor to demonstrate
the degree of departure the case appears to signal.
A. The Clearly-Established-Law Test’s Trajectory
The basic framework for contemporary qualified immunity
doctrine was announced by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
a Bivens action brought against aides to President Nixon who allegedly
conspired to illegally terminate the plaintiff’s employment.34 While
rejecting the defendants’ claim that as presidential aides they shared
the president’s absolute immunity from suit for conduct undertaken in
the course of their duties, the Court nevertheless held that they, like the
mine run of executive officials, possessed “qualified immunity” from
suit.35 The notion that government officials might be shielded from
liability even if their conduct did indeed violate the Constitution was
not newly introduced in Harlow. Fifteen years previously, in Pierson v.
Ray, the Court first announced that police officers were not civilly
liable for unconstitutional arrests that were carried out in “good faith”

34. To be sure, there is an important debate about whether the Supreme Court is the
appropriate or optimal branch of government to end or reform qualified immunity, if that is the
goal. Congress is, of course, the primary rival, or additional, candidate. Compare Scott
Michelman, The Best Branch Qualified to Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999,
2013 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme Court need not defer to Congressional authority to
abolish qualified immunity), and Baude, supra note 1, at 80–81 (making the case that the Court
can and should eliminate qualified immunity), with Nielson & Walker, Qualified Defense, supra
note 1, at 1856–63 (arguing that stare decisis prevents Court from abolishing qualified immunity
and that it is for Congress to act). Aaron Nielson and Chris Walker have recently argued that
states are best-suited to craft legal regimes adapted to–and perhaps mitigating the litigationsuppressive effects of–the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher
J. Walker, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, 109 GEO. L.J. 229 (2020) [hereinafter, Nielson &
Walker, Qualified Immunity and Federalism]. This Article takes no position in this debate. The
variety in the details of the circuits’ qualified immunity regimes could influence other courts,
Congress, or the states.
34. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
35. Id. at 808–12.
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and with “probable cause.”36 In subsequent decisions, the Court
expanded the category of officials eligible to assert the defense of what
became known as “qualified immunity” to all executive officials whose
conduct, however unconstitutional, was undertaken with a
“reasonable” and “good faith” belief in its legality.37 Harlow, however,
made a course correction. The Court announced that adjudication of
the factually nuanced condition of “good faith” struck a suboptimal
balance of competing values, identified as “the importance of a
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, . . . but also ‘the need
to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
authority.’”38 Hoping to better protect the latter value by facilitating
early dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits and minimizing the burdens of
litigation on official defendants, the Court fashioned an “objective”
qualified immunity test to replace the subjective “good faith” inquiry:
“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”39 Thus, the “clearlyestablished-law” test was born.
Harlow was silent, however, on the details of just what it meant for
law to be “clearly established” to a reasonable person—on how
specifically a previously rendered judicial statement of law must speak
to a situation that confronts an official. The Court’s early post-Harlow
decisions provided little elaboration. In Davis v. Scherer, the Court’s
first post-Harlow case to apply the clearly-established-law test, the
Court ruled that a state official who dismissed a state highway
patrolman without formal termination proceedings was entitled to
qualified immunity because at the time of the conduct giving rise to the
suit neither the Court nor the Fifth Circuit (in which the case was filed)
had declared a “federal constitutional right to a pre-termination or a
prompt post-termination hearing.”40 The Court had no occasion to
examine the degree of legal clarity required, given that existing
precedent denied the requirement of a hearing under any
circumstances.

36. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
37. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974).
38. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)).
39. Id. at 818.
40. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191–92 (1984).
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But in Anderson v. Creighton, involving a suit for violation of
Fourth Amendment rights against a police officer who executed a
warrantless home search, the Court squarely addressed the issue of
“the level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be
identified” for purposes of the clearly-established-law test, and
emphasized that the inquiry must be undertaken with some degree of
factual particularity.41 The Court explained as follows:
[T]he right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the
Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action
that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the
particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right.
Much the same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory
violation. But if the test of “clearly established law” were to be
applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to
the “objective legal reasonableness” that is the touchstone of
Harlow. . . . It should not be surprising, therefore, that our cases
establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must
have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence
more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.42

For purposes of the claim in Anderson, this meant that locating
legal support for the abstract “right to be free from warrantless
searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable
cause and there are exigent circumstances” was insufficient for
purposes of defeating qualified immunity.43 Instead, Anderson was
entitled to qualified immunity if, given both the state of the law of the
Fourth Amendment and the particular circumstances he faced, he
reasonably could have believed that search of the plaintiffs’ home was
lawful.44 Thus, the era of “factual particularity” as a central feature of
the clearly-established-law test was born.
Even so, Anderson’s requirement that the law be clearly established
with sufficient factual particularity that an official could recognize the
illegality of their conduct left room for interpretation about the point
at which the unlawfulness of conduct is, in Anderson’s phrasing,
reasonably “apparent.”45 Must a court have adjudicated a nearly41. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
42. Id. at 639–40.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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factually-identical claim? Or do officials bear some burden of
predicting the application of existing law to new factual scenarios? It is
with respect to this issue that the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence of the last two decades has been most conflicted, and
most criticized.
As late as 2002, in Hope v. Pelzer, the Court suggested that it would
not allow qualified immunity to evolve into a “one-bite rule” for
government officials.46 Hope involved a claim that prison officials
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment when they handcuffed the plaintiff to a hitching post for
multiple hours in the Alabama heat and sun.47 No court had ever
adjudicated a claim involving precisely such facts; the closest the
Eleventh Circuit had come was holding that handcuffing prisoners to
cells or fences for prolonged periods amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment.48 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s grant of qualified
immunity on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to unearth prior
cases involving “materially similar” facts, the Supreme Court reversed,
and rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “rigid” demand that plaintiffs
identify prior cases factually on all fours with their own claims in order
to overcome assertions of immunity.49 Observing that the touchstone of
qualified immunity was a concern for fair notice, the Court emphasized
that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances,” and that “earlier
cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts’” are not necessary to
support a finding that the law provided fair warning to an official.50
Prior judicial condemnation of wanton corporal punishment and the
denial of water to prisoners, paired with reports from the Department
of Justice advising Alabama prison officials about the illegality of their
hitching-post practices, sufficed to make clear the defendants’ lack of
entitlement to qualified immunity.51
For nearly two decades, however, Hope would not be cited by the
Supreme Court in support of a determination that clearly established
law supported a denial of qualified immunity. And although the Court
paid lip service to the principle that “novel factual circumstances” do

46. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
47. Id. at 733–35.
48. Id. at 742.
49. Id. at 739.
50. Id. at 739–41.
51. Id.
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not automatically foreclose civil liability for officials’ constitutional
transgressions, the substance and tone of the Court’s qualified
immunity decisions effectively suggested the opposite. Finding only
once in that time period that a plaintiff had succeeded in overcoming
the clearly-established-law hurdle—two years after Hope, in the 2004
case Groh v. Ramirez52— the Court began a steady doctrinal march that
moved the goal post for plaintiffs and disciplined intransigent lower
courts.53 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd was perhaps the watershed opinion in this
regard.54 The 2011 decision subtly rephrased the metric for assessing
whether law was clearly established from examining whether “a
reasonable official” would understand their conduct to be “illegal”55 to
requiring the greater showing that “every reasonable official” would
share the belief.56 The decision also revived language that first appeared
in the Court’s 1986 decision in Malley v. Briggs, describing qualified
immunity as shielding “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”57 Malley, a decision rejecting police officers’
claim to absolute immunity from suit for serving falsely sworn warrants,
deployed that language in dicta for the purpose of reassuring that
qualified immunity was sufficiently protective of police defendants.58 In
the hands of the al-Kidd majority, the language was transformed into a
measure for determining whether qualified immunity was “properly
applied”–a metric that audaciously equated a “reasonable” official
with one just shy of “plain[] incompeten[ce].”59
The Court’s decisions following al-Kidd demonstrated the power of
a shield from liability that required plaintiffs to find a prior case so
factually on point that only a “plainly incompetent” officer could fail
to see that it prohibited their precise actions.60 In the decade following
al-Kidd, the Court frequently filled its terms’ dockets with multiple

52. See generally Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (holding that there was no qualified
immunity when the search warrant failed to adequately describe what is being looked for).
53. See Baude, supra note 1, at 82—83 (discussing the Court’s asymmetrical qualified immunity
dispositions).
54. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
55. As formulated in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637 (1987) (emphasis added).
56. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 743 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
58. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
59. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743.
60. See Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV.
1219, 1248 (2015) (discussing impact of Al-Kidd’s shift in focus toward factual specificity and a
focus on the “plainly incompetent” officer).
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grants of certiorari to reverse denials of qualified immunity.61 Fourteen
cases in those years considered a lower court’s application of the
clearly-established-law test; in every one, the Court found the law not
clearly established, consistently citing al-Kidd for the primary
statement of qualified immunity’s contours, and nearly always quoting
the metric of “plain[] incompeten[ce].”62 Consistently as well, the
Court upbraided lower courts for their reliance on overly general
principles of law or factually dissimilar cases to conclude that the
illegality of the defendants’ conduct was clearly established.63
61. See Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (remarking on two reversals of qualified immunity denials in 2017, three in 2015, and
one each in 2014 and 2013); Reinhardt, supra note 60, at 1248 (“[I]n October Term 2013 alone,
the Court found that actions by state agents were protected by qualified immunity in four cases
based on its assertion that the constitutional violation alleged was not beyond debate in the
existing case law at the time of the actions.”); see also Baude, supra note 1, at 85 (describing
Court’s qualified-immunity-laden docket in comparison to broader certiorari trends and
concluding that it points to “special” and “unusual” treatment of the doctrine); infra note 62
(enumerating the Court’s post-al-Kidd decisions).
62. The “plainly incompetent” language appears in support of the Court’s reversals in ten of the
fourteen cases in this time period. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018); District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017);
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam);
Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611
(2015); Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013);
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012). Three additional qualified immunity grants
cite al-Kidd but without specific invocation of a “plainly incompetent” test. See Lane v. Franks,
573 U.S. 228, 243 (2014) (noting that al-Kidd states that qualified immunity allows for breathing
room for government officials); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014) (citing al-Kidd
for the proposition that the violation must be clearly established and that any reasonable officer
would have understood the violation); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014) (using al-Kidd for
the idea that the officer must have violated a clearly established right for qualified immunity to
not apply). One post-al-Kidd decision failed to cite al-Kidd, but instead elaborated the qualified
immunity standard with citation to Kisela, omitting that case’s quotation to al-Kidd. City of
Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019). There were two cases in this time period in
which the Court reversed grants of qualified immunity. Neither involved the question of how
clearly the law must speak to the defendant’s conduct in order to be clearly established. Rather,
both concerned the question of what facts a court should consider in conducting the clearlyestablished-law test. In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit erroneously
considered facts that were not known to the defendant officer–namely, the nationality of the
individual the defendant Border Patrol officer shot–in evaluating qualified immunity. Hernandez
v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017). And in Tolan v. Cotton, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit
erroneously construed the summary judgment record in the defendant’s favor rather than the
non-moving plaintiff, in describing the facts that governed its qualified immunity analysis. Tolan
v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014).
63. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (“This Court has ‘repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit
in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.’” (quoting
Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 613 (internal quotations omitted)); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779,
134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1056 (2014) (citing Al-Kidd for the proposition that “‘[w]e
have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of
generality’”); Baude, supra note 1, at 83—84 (characterizing recent decisions as “regularly
remind[ing] lower courts” about the factual particularity demanded of the clearly-established-
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Kisela v. Hughes is representative of how the trajectory of these
decisions raised the bar for plaintiffs trying to clear the clearlyestablished-law hurdle.64 The suit was brought for a police officer’s
alleged violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
of excessive force.65 The officer had responded to a call stating that the
plaintiff was behaving erratically and holding a knife.66 When the
officer located the plaintiff, she was holding a large kitchen knife in the
yard of her home as she stood on the other side of a chain link fence,
approximately six feet away from another individual.67 The plaintiff was
behaving calmly, but twice ignored the officer’s command that she drop
the knife; at that point the officer fired on her, inflicting non-fatal
injuries.68 The Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, pointing to Deorle
v. Rutherford, which had found the Fourth Amendment violated by a
police officer who fired a bean bag at the face of a man who had
brandished a hatchet, verbally threatened the police, and walked
toward the defendant officer with a bottle of lighter fluid.69
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a per curiam,
summary opinion that blasted the lower court, emphasizing that the
Court had “repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in
particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.”70 Moreover, the Court emphasized (not for the first time)
that Fourth Amendment excessive force cases pose special reasons to
formulate the clearly established law with an especially high degree of
factual particularity: “Use of excessive force is an area of the law ‘in
which the result depends very much on the facts of each case,’ and thus
police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing
precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.”71 The Court
excoriated the Ninth Circuit’s comparison between shooting an
individual advancing with lighter fluid and shooting a person armed
law test, making “ hard to find a roadmap to the denial of immunity that could give a lower
court confidence in its conclusion”).
64. See generally Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1148 (holding that it was reasonable for the officer to shoot
a woman who was holding a knife and standing six feet from her roommate).
65. Id. at 1151.
66. Id. at 1150.
67. Id. at 1151.
68. Id.
69. Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended (June 27, 2017), rev’d, 138 S.
Ct. 1148 (2018) (discussing Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2001)).
70. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City & Cnty. of S.F. v.
Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011))).
71. Id. at 1152—53 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)).
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with a knife and “within striking distance” of another, concluding that
“[w]hatever the merits of . . . Deorle, the differences between that case
and the case before us leap from the page.”72 As John Jeffries inimitably
characterized the clearly-established-law test’s evolution, particularly
in the context of Fourth Amendment claims, “[i]t is as if the one-bite
rule for bad dogs started over with every change in weather
conditions.”73
While qualified immunity had long been a doctrine of ill repute
among academics, as its scope expanded so too did the breadth and
depth of negative attention it received. Fresh academic examination
challenged empirical assumptions underlying qualified immunity—
that it operates to prevent over-deterrence of socially beneficial activity
by officials—and provided normative critiques from Originalist
quarters.74 This work in turn attracted even more attention from jurists
discontent with the Court’s directions on the subject, including several
of the justices themselves.75 Then came the 2020 racial justice and
policing protests, and suddenly a once-obscure legal doctrine was
emblazoned on placards and shouted in chants calling for an end to
qualified immunity.76 In red and blue legislatures across the country,
bills were introduced to abolish or otherwise counteract the effects of

72. Id. at 1154 (quoting Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 614).
73. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 256 (2013).
74. See generally Baude, supra note 1 (arguing that the justifications of “good faith” defense,
correcting earlier mistakes in statues, and the rule of lenity are not adequate to justify qualified
immunity); Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 1 (finding that “qualified
immunity rarely served its intended role as a shield from discovery and trial” in an analysis of
1,183 cases); Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 1 (finding that “police officers are
virtually always indemnified” in cases alleging civil rights violations).
75. See, e.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari) (“I have previously expressed my doubts about our qualified immunity
jurisprudence . . . . Because our § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine appears to stray from the
statutory text, I would grant this petition [to reconsider qualified immunity].”); Kisela, 138 S. Ct.
at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that decision “tells officers that they can shoot first
and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished”);
Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479–80 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“restat[ing] . . . unease with the real-world functioning of modern immunity
practice,” and citing Baude and Schwartz, among others); Spainhoward v. White Cnty., 421 F.
Supp. 3d 524, 540 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (granting qualified immunity but “acknowledg[ing] that
qualified immunity is a controversial doctrine that can (1) lead to the head-scratching and
frustrating outcome of a ‘right’ becoming ‘clearly established’ at the pleasure and indeterminate
speed of various jurists, and (2) undercut some of the core purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
76. See Madeleine Carlisle, The Debate Over Qualified Immunity Is at the Heart of Police
Reform. Here’s What to Know, TIME (Jun. 3, 2021, 6:35 PM), https://time.com/6061624/what-isqualified-immunity (discussing qualified immunity reform and showing a photograph of antiqualified-immunity protest signs).
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qualified immunity doctrine.77 Some even passed and were signed into
law at the state and local levels.78 Meanwhile, a politically diverse
coalition of lawyers and advocates who had strategized to persuade the
Court to reconsider its qualified immunity jurisprudence, had advanced
several petitions for certiorari to the Court as vehicles for such a move.
As the Court repeatedly relisted those petitions for conference at the
very moment that outrage against qualified immunity was in the ether,
those advocates perhaps enjoyed a sense of optimism.79
B. Taylor’s Tone Shift
In retrospect, any such optimism was misguided. In the waning days
of its 2019 Term, the Court finally declined those invitations to take up
the question of qualified immunity’s future.80 It is impossible to know
why. Perhaps there simply were not enough justices prepared to
coalesce around an alternative to existing doctrine. Perhaps, as one
Court-watcher has speculated, at least some justices believed Congress
was the preferable institutional actor.81 It may be that the answer is in
any event irrelevant to understanding the significance of the decision
in Taylor v. Riojas several months later. On the other hand, it is within
the realm of possibility to suppose that Taylor presented itself to at
least some of the justices as an appealing alternative to the sort of
wholesale revisiting of qualified immunity that was urged in the
rejected petitions, an opportunity to fine tune rather than
fundamentally alter the doctrine. 82 The next section turns to Taylor

77. See, e.g., George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020); Kindy,
supra note 32 (reporting in October 2021 that “state legislators across the country tried to undo”
qualified immunity and that “[a]t least 35 state qualified-immunity bills have died in the past 18
months”).
78. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-4 (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-21-131(1)–
(2)(b) (West 2021); 2020 Conn. Pub. Acts 20-1 (Spec. Sess.); N.Y.C. Local Law No. 2021/048.
79. See Joanna Schwartz, The Supreme Court Is Giving Lower Courts a Subtle Hint to Rein In
Police Misconduct, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/the-supreme-courts-message-on-policemisconduct-is-changing/618193/ [hereinafter Schwartz, Police Misconduct] (“In its 2019–20 term,
the Supreme Court took months to decide whether to hear one or more of the many qualifiedimmunity cases pending before it—a hesitation some took as a sign that the Court might finally
act.”).
80. Schweikert, supra note 3030.
81. See id. (“But one possibility is that the Justices were looking closely at developments in
Congress . . . and decided to duck the question, hoping to pressure Congress to fix the Court’s
mess.”).
82. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinksy: SCOTUS Hands Down a Rare Civil Rights Victory on
J.
(Feb.
1,
2021
9:11
AM),
Qualified
Immunity,
ABA
https://www.abajournal.com/columns/article/chemerinsky-scotus-hands-down-a-rare-civil-rights-
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and examines the degree to which it subtly parted company with the
doctrinal trajectory traced above.
The case involved a suit for alleged violation of Taylor’s Eighth
Amendment rights by corrections officers who forced him to inhabit
horrifically unsanitary cells in a prison psychiatric unit for a total of six
days.83 Taylor’s first cell, in the Fifth Circuit’s recounting of the
summary judgment record, was covered on every surface–floor, walls,
ceiling–with “‘massive amounts’ of feces that emitted a ‘strong fecal
odor.’”84 Taylor was required by rules of the psychiatric unit to be
naked in the cell and was unable to drink water because the cell pipes
contained feces.85 The defendants were aware of the cell’s condition,
and mocked Taylor rather than cleaning it.86 A day later Taylor (still
naked) was moved to a second cell with equally disgusting conditions:
no toilet, water fountain, or bunk, frigidly cold, and only a drain on the
floor for urination, which was clogged and covering the floor with raw
sewage.87 The defendants refused to allow Taylor access to any other
bathroom facilities.88
In ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
Fifth Circuit first addressed the question of whether Taylor’s evidence
created a genuine dispute as to the existence of a constitutional
violation, and concluded that it did. The court applied the applicable
two-pronged test for evaluating prison conditions’ compliance with the
Eighth Amendment—assessing whether the conditions created an
objective risk of harm, and whether officials were deliberately
indifferent to that risk—and concluded that the conditions alleged by
Taylor were on par with prior decisions finding that prisoners had been
“exposed [] to a substantial risk of serious harm and denied [] the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”89 The court further
determined that Taylor had created a sufficient record of the
defendants’ awareness of and deliberate indifference to those
deprivations.90 But the court dismissed on qualified immunity grounds
victory-on-qualified-immunity (hypothesizing that Taylor might be “a response to . . . criticism”
of qualified immunity and the Court).
83. See Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Taylor
v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020).
84. Id. at 218.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 218–19.
89. Id. at 220–21
90. Id. at 221–22.
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because, it determined, the illegality of the guards’ actions at the time
of Taylor’s incarceration was not clearly established.91 Discussion of the
point was brief: Taylor’s tenure in the filthy cells was six days, and
“[t]hough the law was clear that prisoners couldn’t be housed in cells
teeming with human waste for months on end, . . . [the court] hadn’t
previously held that a time period so short violated the Constitution . .
. .”92 Indeed, the court suggested that the Supreme Court itself had
created ambiguity when it noted in dicta in Hutto v. Finney that a
“filthy, overcrowded cell . . . might be tolerable for a few days and
intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”93
Taylor sought certiorari, asking that the Court review the Fifth
Circuit’s application of the clearly-established-law test, but also inviting
the Court to narrow or abolish “the judge-made doctrine of qualified
immunity . . . .”94 The Court declined to take up the latter question, but
granted certiorari, vacated the Fifth Circuit, and remanded the case.95
The Court’s brief, per curiam opinion (the merits discussion is a mere
two paragraphs), rejected the Fifth Circuit’s clearly-established-law
analysis and concluded instead that “no reasonable correctional officer
could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this
case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such
deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of
time.”96 More noteworthy than this conclusion, however, were the
authorities cited, and not cited, in support of it. Absent was any whiff
of reference to al-Kidd or invocation of its language. In a first for the
Court, the opinion relied on Hope v. Pelzer to supply the proposition
that “‘a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional
law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in
question.’”97 In the absence of any record evidence that the conditions
Taylor faced were “compelled by necessity or exigency[,]” or of “any
91. Id. at 222.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1978).
94. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at ii, Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (No. 19-1261).
95. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020).
96. Id. The opinion garnered seven votes. Justice Thomas dissented without opinion, and Justice
Barrett took no part in the decision. Justice Alito wrote a rather lengthy concurrence setting forth
his disagreement with the decision to grant certiorari in a case that, in his judgment, addressed no
circuit split, did not conclusively resolve the issue in the case (since the defense of qualified
immunity could be renewed at a later stage), and in which the plaintiff had little stake because
other non-dismissed claims remained for the district court to take up. Id. at 55–56 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment). However, Justice Alito concurred in the conclusion that the Fifth
Circuit had erred in its analysis. Id.
97. Id. at 53–54 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (internal quotes omitted).
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reason to suspect that the conditions of Taylor’s confinement could not
have been mitigated, either in degree or duration[,]” the facts known
to the defendants were “particularly egregious,” and qualified
immunity was not warranted.98
Several months later, the Court handed the Fifth Circuit another
reversal in McCoy v. Alamu, in which the lower court had granted
qualified immunity to a corrections officer sued for violating a
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.99 The factual allegations,
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, were that
defendant Alamu, while patrolling a cell block, sprayed McCoy in the
face with his chemical spray “for no reason”–apparently against the
backdrop of prior harassment of Alamu by entirely different
prisoners.100 Applying the test from Hudson v. McMillian to determine
whether Alamu’s use of force against McCoy violated the Eighth
Amendment, the Fifth Circuit concluded that McCoy’s facts did make
out a violation.101 But, as in Taylor, the court went on to conclude that
the illegality of Alamu’s actions was not clearly established.102 With a
recitation of the governing caselaw on qualified immunity that included
two gestures toward the fervor of the Supreme Court’s view “about the
difficulty of showing that the law was clearly established,” the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the claim must be dismissed because none of its
prior published decisions had established that the type or amount of
chemical spray deployed on McCoy amounted to more than de minimis
force, a requirement for conduct to violate the Eighth Amendment.103
The court reached this conclusion in the face of decisions that had held
unconstitutional other forms of gratuitously inflicted less-than-lethal
forms of force.104
McCoy sought certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted the
petition, vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the Fifth
Circuit “for further consideration in light of Taylor v. Riojas. . . .”105 The
GVR supplied no reasoning, and so observers were left to speculate
about the significance of McCoy’s suggestion that Taylor might have

98. Id. at 54.
99. See McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021); McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d 226, 228 (5th
Cir. 2020), cert. granted, vacated, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 209 L. Ed. 2d 114 (2021).
100. McCoy, 950 F.3d at 229.
101. Id. at 230–31 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
102. Id. at 234.
103. Id. at 232–34 (internal citations omitted).
104. Id. at 235 (Costa, J., dissenting).
105. McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021).
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some bearing on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in the case. Some, including
the Fifth Circuit itself, have begun to do so.106 As the next Section
reveals, lower courts in particular have arrived at a perhaps surprising
diversity of views about what, if anything, the Supreme Court’s recent
qualified immunity pronouncements portend for the doctrine’s future
trajectory.107 But whatever the future holds, the Court’s 2020 Term
qualified immunity docket could hardly have sounded in a more
diametrically different register than those of recent memory.
II. POST-TAYLOR FUTURES
Taylor was arresting for observers of the Court’s qualified
immunity doctrine, and McCoy only added to the appearance of the
Court’s adoption of a fundamentally different tone. Scholarly reactions
to Taylor and McCoy seem to be converging around the view that the
cases signal a shift toward the Court’s embrace of a less stringent
clearly-established-law test.108 To be sure, as suggested in Part I,

106. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 2 F.4th 506, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2021) (Oldham, J.,
concurring) (“It’s true that summary reversals can constitute sharp rebukes. . . . And these
summary orders are particularly remarkable because they are the Court’s first- and second-ever
invocations of the obvious-case exception to the clearly established law requirement.”); id. at 523
(Willett, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court’s reliance on Taylor [in McCoy] confirms that the
Court does not consider that case an anomaly, but instead a course correction signaling lower
courts to deny immunity for clear misconduct, even in cases with unique facts.”); Ortiz v. New
Mexico, No. CIV 18-0028 JB/LF, 2021 WL 3115577, at *74–79 (D.N.M. July 22, 2021) (attributing
proposition that courts must ask whether the conduct was “particularly egregious,” which is
language from Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020), to McCoy); Miller, supra note 18, at 223–
24 (discussing two possible interpretations of the Court’s summary disposition in McCoy);
Schwartz, Police Misconduct, supra note 79 (discussing McCoy and possible interpretations);
Anya Bidwell & Patrick Jaicomo, Lower Courts Take Notice: The Supreme Court Is Rethinking
TODAY
(Mar.
2,
2021,
4:00
AM),
Qualified
Immunity,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/03/02/supreme-court-might-rethinking-qualifiedimmunity-column/4576549001 (discussing McCoy); Jay Schweikert, The Supreme Court Won’t
Save Us From Qualified Immunity, CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG (Mar. 3, 2021, 4:58 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-wont-save-us-qualified-immunity (discussing McCoy).
107. See infra Parts II A & B.
108. See Miller, supra note 18, at 223–24 (concluding that the most plausible of two possible
readings of Taylor and McCoy is that the Court is prohibiting “comparative qualified immunity
analysis,” and that “unless there is a case directly on point in either direction, every qualified
immunity case should stand or fall on its own merits, based on whether any reasonable officer
should have realized that his behavior contravened the Constitution”); Schwartz, Police
Misconduct, supra note 79 (“For years, the Supreme Court has sent a clear message to lower
courts: Police officers can’t be sued for violating someone’s constitutional rights unless the specific
actions at issue have previously been held unconstitutional. . . . But in the past few months . . . the
Supreme Court seems to be quietly changing its message.”). Katherine Mims Crocker appears to
endorse the view that Taylor signals some change, but perhaps a more modest one than what
Professor Miller suggests. Crocker, supra note 22, at 7, 12 (characterizing Miller’s as the “idealist”
view and suggesting embrace of a more modest “optimism”).
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consideration of the political context in which the cases were decided
enhances the plausibility of that view.109 The Court began its 2020 Term
on the heels of a groundswell of protest against police violence in
general, and qualified immunity in particular. Particularly given Chief
Justice Roberts’ reputation for being influenced by the value of the
Court’s institutional legitimacy, an interpretation of Taylor as a means
of communicating the Court’s sensitivity to qualified immunity’s
potential excesses fits the moment.110 Nevertheless, analysis of Taylor
and examination of the work of the lower federal courts tasked with
faithfully applying the Court’s directives reveals that the implications
of the decisions for the future of qualified immunity doctrine are not
so clear. Part II.A. argues that the future might plausibly hold no
change or even a stronger qualified immunity defense, while Part II.B.
makes the case that Taylor could portend a weakening of qualified
immunity via the Court’s blessing of a less restrictive clearlyestablished-law analysis. Part II.C. examines the possibility that Taylor
signals that the Court is broadly open to reforming qualified
immunity’s excesses beyond the parameters of the clearly-establishedlaw inquiry, and discusses various procedural rules that could thereby
take broader hold in the lower courts. Methodologically, this Part
suggests that appreciating the existing heterogeneity of lower court
qualified immunity doctrine—a matter often ignored by examinations
of qualified immunity centered around the Supreme Court’s work—is
necessary to appreciate the full range of Taylor’s potential
significance.111
A. “Meet the New Boss . . .”
Notwithstanding the marked contrast between Taylor and the
recent qualified immunity decisions that preceded it, it is possible that
lower courts will receive it as a one-off outlier rather than a harbinger

109. See supra text accompanying notes 74–79 (discussing the social and political environment
when the cases were decided).
110. See Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, ATLANTIC (Jul. 14,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/john-roberts-just-who-supreme-courtneeded/614053.
111. One exception to that rule is Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, supra note 4
and accompanying text. Additionally, Aaron Nielson and Chris Walker have urged greater
attention to state and local civil liability and immunity regimes that render qualified immunity
on the ground “not a unitary concept.” Nielson & Walker, Qualified Immunity and Federalism,
supra note 34 at 294.
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of change. Some already have.112 The brief opinion itself is modest,
stating only that Hope remains good law and noting the “particularly
egregious facts” of the case.113 Further, though the opinion does not cite
al-Kidd, its stated conclusion that “no reasonable corrections officer”
could have thought the defendant’s behavior constitutional114 could be
understood as doubling down on al-Kidd’s “every reasonable official”
formulation of the clearly-established-law test,115 with Mr. Taylor
presenting the “rare” case in which al-Kidd’s metric could be met— a
case of “plain[] incompeten[ce].”116 Perhaps rather than offering an
invitation to scale back qualified immunity, Taylor simply demonstrates
the outer bound of immunity that already existed in the law, or in the
Ninth Circuit’s words, “highlights the level of blatantly unconstitutional
conduct necessary to satisfy the obviousness principle.”117
Indeed, if the magnitude of egregiousness seen in Taylor is a
necessary rather than only sufficient condition for Hope’s
“obviousness” principle to apply, as the Ninth Circuit has suggested, the
decision arguably narrows Hope. Several circuits had, prior to Taylor,
applied Hope to deny qualified immunity in the absence of factually
apposite prior cases in circumstances that would be hard to
characterize as comparably egregious to those in Hope, but where
applicable legal principles were deemed sufficiently clarified in the
abstract.118 For example, in Hernandez v. City of San Jose, the Ninth

112. See O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1044 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Taylor only highlights the level
of blatantly unconstitutional conduct necessary to satisfy the obviousness principle. Suffice to say,
this case bears no reasonable comparison to Taylor.”); Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 206 (5th Cir.
2021) (“It might seem that things changed with the recent opinion in [Taylor]. But, instead, that
decision emphasizes the high standard.”).
113. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per curiam).
114. Id. at 53.
115. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
635 (1987)).
116. Id. at 743 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 335 (1986)).
117. O’Doan, 991 F.3d at 1044; see also Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 593 n.193 (“More recently,
however, the Court has stressed that on egregious facts, qualified immunity should be denied
regardless whether there are factually similar precedents.”).
118. Compare Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (focusing on
clarity of legal principles in prior cases), with Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2019)
(holding that Hope did not apply to deny qualified immunity to officers who assigned “severely
intoxicated” detainee to a top bunk because “[e]xamination of the specific context of the Officers’
conduct in this case shows that it was not ‘egregiously’ or ‘obviously unreasonable’” (quoting
Lovett v. Herbert, 907 F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir. 2018))), and Guertin v. Michigan, 924 F.3d 309, 314–
15 (6th Cir. 2019) (Sutton, J., concurring) (describing Hope as presenting “unique” facts and
concluding that “[w]hat permitted the U.S. Supreme Court to hold that the state officials violated
clearly established norms turned not on any one precedent but on the egregiousness of the state
officials’ state of mind”).
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Circuit denied qualified immunity to police officers who, in managing
crowd control at a protest, allegedly guided protestors into the path of
violent counter-protestors and confined them to the area where
violence was known by police to be occurring.119 The court found both
that the plaintiffs’ facts supported the finding of a violation of due
process on a ‘state-created-danger theory,’ and that the law was clearly
established.120 Citing Hope for the premise that the law can apply with
“obvious clarity” to a defendant’s conduct in the absence of a
controlling case on point, the court held that a prior decision, which
rejected a state-created-danger claim stemming from police crowd
control on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked evidence of affirmative
action increasing the risk of harm to them, sufficiently established the
illegality of the defendants’ alleged risk-exacerbating actions.121
Significantly, however, the Hernandez defendants’ crowd control plan
was alleged to have been selected in order to avoid causing a “riot”—
perhaps a “poorly conceived” choice, but one that is hard to
characterize as approaching the egregiousness of the official conduct in
Taylor.122
By contrast, decisions out of the Seventh Circuit exemplify a much
narrower reading of Hope’s measure of “obvious clarity,” holding that
“[i]f no existing precedent puts the conduct beyond debate,” then an
“obvious” violation under Hope arises only in the face of “egregious”
official conduct.123 In Leiser v. Kloth, for example, the court granted
qualified immunity on the ground that the law had not clearly
established that the Eighth Amendment barred a corrections officer
from regularly standing directly behind a prisoner who reported that
such conduct activated his post-traumatic stress disorder. Finding no
prior case on point, the court then analyzed whether Hope’s “obvious
clarity” exception applied by examining whether the defendant’s
“conduct was so outrageous that no reasonable correctional officer
would have believed [it] was legal.”124 According to the court, it was

119. Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1138.
120. Id. at 1133—39. As the court explained in Hernandez, a ‘state-created-danger theory’ for a
due process claim provides that state actors have a limited duty to protect individuals from
private violence where officials affirmatively act to expose individuals to dangers they would not
otherwise face, and exhibit deliberate indifference to the dangerous risk they have created. Id.
at 1133.
121. Id. (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
122. Id. at 1129–30.
123. Leiser, 933 F.3d at 702.
124. Id. at 704.
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not.125 The Seventh Circuit’s understanding of Hope’s “obvious clarity”
rule appears conceptually quite different from the Ninth Circuit’s,
seemingly viewing it as a limited exception for outrageous conduct
rather than a direction to examine whether existing law gave adequate
guidance to officials about how to conduct themselves. More
practically, the Seventh Circuit’s approach, as compared to the Ninth
Circuit, narrows Hope. It is certainly arguable that the plaintiff in
Hernandez would not overcome an assertion of qualified immunity in
the Seventh Circuit, given that the defendants articulated at least some
legitimate law enforcement purpose (crowd control) for their chosen
conduct.126 To the extent that courts in jurisdictions that previously
followed the Ninth Circuit’s broader view of Hope conclude (as some
have) that Taylor endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s narrower view, the
effect will be to shift the law in those jurisdictions in favor of a more
muscular qualified immunity.127
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in McCoy does not
necessarily change the analysis. Taken at face value, McCoy offers no
substantive guidance: the Court issued no opinion, as is typical in
GVRs. If McCoy is nevertheless a signal, it is certainly susceptible of
multiple plausible interpretations. Professor Colin Miller has argued
that McCoy indicates a softening of the clearly-established-law test
outside the narrow confines of “egregious” cases. Miller leans on the
Court’s stated standard for issuance of a GVR: “[w]here intervening
developments, or recent developments that we have reason to believe
the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability
that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would

125. Id. at 705.
126. Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1129—30 (9th Cir. 2018).
127. See HIRA Educ. Servs. N. Am. v. Augustine, 991 F.3d 180, 192 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The
recent Supreme Court decision in [Taylor v. Riojas] does not change our analysis in this case. The
Legislators’ actions were not so outrageous that ‘no reasonable . . . officer could have concluded’
they were permissible under the Constitution . . . .” (quoting Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 54)); Frasier v.
Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 2021) (“Hope’s holding historically has been applied to
only the ‘rare obvious case’ . . . involving ‘extreme circumstances,’ or ‘particularly egregious’
misconduct. . . . Even a cursory consideration of these facts—in the light of cases like Taylor and
Hope—makes clear that this is not such a rare case.” (citations omitted) (quoting Taylor, 141 S.
Ct. at 53)); Vaughn v. Acosta, No. EP20CV00246KCATB, 2021 WL 232135, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 22, 2021) (“Absent prior judicial precedent, ‘extreme circumstances’ or ‘particularly
egregious facts’ allow a court to find that ‘any reasonable officer should [ ] realize[ ] that [a
defendant’s actions] offended the Constitution’ . . . . Here, Acosta’s actions are distinguishable
from Taylor. No reasonable officer would equate a one-time throwing of water on a prisoner with
confining a prisoner for days in feces and sewage.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53–54)).

LAURIN_3.27.22 (DO NOT DELETE)

268

4/20/2022 8:36 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

reject if given the opportunity for further consideration.”128 He
concludes that, because the Court must have believed there was a
“reasonable probability” that McCoy would come out differently on
remand, and because the facts in McCoy cannot plausibly be
characterized as “egregious,” the Court’s decision to GVR means that
egregiousness was not necessary to Mr. Taylor’s overcoming qualified
immunity.129 Perhaps. On the other hand, it is not altogether clear that
there is no “reasonable probability” that unprovoked chemical
spraying is not “egregious.” The dissenting Fifth Circuit judge in
McCoy emphasized the “gratuitous” nature of the force and the serious
injury that pepper spray can cause.130 That the facts of McCoy are less
egregious than those in Taylor does not necessarily resolve the question
of whether they still qualify for the category.131
The point is not to conclusively establish what the Court meant in
deciding Taylor and McCoy as it did. There is sufficient ambiguity in
that meaning to cause lower courts to read the cases as maintaining the
status quo of the clearly-established-law test, or even signaling that a
previously under-specified category of “obvious” legal violation
blessed in Hope is in fact a narrower category than some lower courts
had previously concluded.
B. A “Clear” Shift–But to What?
The foregoing analysis notwithstanding, it is at least plausible to
128. Lawrence ex rel. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (emphasis added).
129. Miller, supra note 18, at 223–24.
130. McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d 226, 235–36 (5th Cir. 2020) (Costa, J., dissenting), vacated, 141 S.
Ct. 1364 (2021).
131. In any event, a GVR is a noisy signal. Scholars have long lamented the actual practice of
the Court’s GVR procedure. See F. Andrew Hessick, The Cost of Remands, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1025, 1034 (2012) (describing the standard produced by the Court’s GVR procedure as “low”
and “overinclusive”); Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the Meaning
of U.S. Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages’ Cases, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513,
514 (2004) (criticizing the Court’s penchant for “reflexively” deploying GVR orders without
carefully reviewing the record). In the instance of McCoy, the case was twice relisted for
conference by the justices two months after Taylor was handed down, suggesting that the Court
likely did have a good understanding of the record, but also perhaps suggesting that there was
dissension over proper disposition of the case. See John Elwood, Disputes Over Church
Property and ACCA Ambiguity, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2021, 4:39 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/disputes-over-church-property-and-acca-ambiguity (noting
double relisting of McCoy); John Elwood et al., The Statistics of Relists, OT 2016 Edition: Has
the Relist Lost its Mojo? Not Quite, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 27, 2017, 3:37 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/statistics-relists-ot-2016-edition-relist-lost-mojo-not-quite
(“Relists appear to be a mechanism for avoiding improvident grants by allowing the justices and
their clerks to double-check for procedural or other obstacles to the resolution of a case on the
merits, known as vehicle problems, before granting.”).
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think that the Court is open to a less defense-protective recalibration
of the clearly-established-law inquiry.132 To be sure, Taylor does not
expressly announce any such shift; it does not overrule or express doubt
about any of the Court’s prior clearly-established-law decisions. But as
scholars of the Court have noted, express statements of holding are not
the only means by which the Court communicates its intentions to
lower courts. Sometimes the Court is more subtle. An example is when,
as Richard Re has explained, the Court “signals” —broadcasts a
direction about how lower courts should apply its rulings through
actions taken within “the traditional adjudicatory process” (such as
summary orders or dicta in majority opinions) that “without
establishing conventional precedent . . . nonetheless indicate some
aspect of how lower courts should decide cases.”133 Taylor’s surprising
citation to the moribund Hope opinion and general shift in tone from
recent qualified immunity decisions—a shift perhaps amplified by
McCoy—could be a signal that the Court is shifting its views on the
stringency of clearly-established-law analysis. Identifying this
possibility, however, begs the question: what will be the mechanisms of
such a recalibration, and how powerful might they be? Once again,
analysis of Taylor and McCoy and close examination of the variation
among lower courts in approaching the clearly-established-law inquiry
yields multiple possible scenarios.
Consider first a fairly minimalist prediction: that the decisions in
Taylor and McCoy might lead to further erosion of the transsubstantive nature of the qualified immunity defense, easing plaintiffs’
paths to demonstrating clearly established law only in the context of
some, but not all, rights claims. This would arguably be a marked change
in qualified immunity, a doctrine that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated applies “across the board” to all constitutional
claims.134 And yet Supreme Court and lower court decisions provide a
foothold for this possibility. In multiple decisions the Court has singled
out Fourth Amendment claims as requiring an especially high level of
factual specificity in order to find the law clearly established.135 “Factual
132. For other commentators advancing this view, see supra note 108.
133. Re, supra note 13, at 942.
134. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203 (2001) (rejecting argument that Fourth Amendment
claims might be treated differently from other constitutional claims for qualified immunity
purposes because “qualified immunity applied in the Fourth Amendment context just as it
would for any other claim of official misconduct”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644
(1986) (“Harlow clearly expressed the understanding that the general principle of qualified
immunity it established would be applied ‘across the board.’”).
135. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015).
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specificity is especially important” in that context, the Court has
repeatedly stated, because “[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to
determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will
apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.”136 Lower courts
have echoed and amplified this sentiment, suggesting that the need for
greater factual specificity applies to any rights that are defined by
reference to a balancing of interests, including not only the Fourth
Amendment but also some First Amendment claims.137 Conversely,
some circuits have stated that particular rights might be clearly
established with a lower standard of factual particularity than what
other claims might require, especially where the test to establish a
constitutional violation includes an element of intention, as is the case
for many (though not all) Eighth Amendment claims.138

136. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)); see also City of Escondido v.
Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (citing Mullenix to reiterate the Court’s position); Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (reiterating the Court’s position in Mullenix).
137. See, e.g., Howse v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e must ask whether
every reasonable officer would know that law enforcement cannot tackle someone who
disobeyed an order and then use additional force if they resist being handcuffed. Importantly,
this question asks about the lawfulness of conduct under the Fourth Amendment. And in that
context, the Supreme Court has stressed ‘the need to identify a case where an officer acting
under similar circumstances’ was found ‘to have violated the Fourth Amendment.’ Without such
a case, the plaintiff will almost always lose.” (internal citations omitted)); Comsys, Inc. v.
Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating that “when case-specific balancing of
interests is essential, the law often is not clear enough to permit awards of damages against
public officials, in the absence of authoritative case law addressing a comparable situation,” and
granting qualified immunity for First and Fourth Amendment claims); Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d
346, 352–53 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Just as Garner and Graham create a generalized excessive force
standard, Turner creates a generalized framework to analyze prisoners’ constitutional claims.
Both describe a multi-factor reasonableness test used to determine whether a defendant’s
actions violated the Constitution. Thus, like the Garner and Graham standard, the Turner test
cannot create clearly established law outside an obvious case.”); Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d
1203, 1210 (11th Cir. 2017) ( “it is particularly difficult to overcome the qualified immunity
defense in the First Amendment context.”).
138. Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 310 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding in case alleging intentional
retaliation against prisoner in violation of Eighth Amendment, “liability turns not on the
particular factual circumstances under which the officer acted–which may change from case to
case as the precedent develops–but on whether the officer acts with a culpable state of mind” and
hence “because an officer necessarily will be familiar with his own mental state, he ‘reasonably
should know’ that he is violating the law” (internal citation omitted)); Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d
726, 750 (6th Cir. 2020) (suggesting that higher level of generality is appropriate where violation
of rights entail the defendant’s deliberate indifference); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797
F.3d 654, 664 (9th Cir. 2015), on reh’g en banc, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (considering Eighth
Amendment claim stemming from inmate-on-inmate attack and observing that in the context of
such claims “[t]he similarity of the facts —or the lack thereof—to other . . . cases has rarely
entered the discussion”). The Ninth Circuit has been fickle on this point. See Hamby v.
Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting any suggest[ion] that the qualifiedimmunity inquiry in Eighth Amendment cases differs from the inquiry in other types of cases,
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Both Taylor and McCoy involved claimed violations of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. So too did
Hope v. Pelzer. While the precise claims and governing precedents were
different,139 all required demonstrating that the defendants acted with
a blameworthy state of mind—precisely the type of evidence that some
lower courts have suggested obviates the need for a factually
particularized clearly-established-law inquiry.140 Although the Court
did not state in Taylor that the particular constitutional context
mattered to the outcome, its prior consistent statements urging
specially strict application of qualified immunity in the Fourth
Amendment context could be understood as unchanged by its
approach in these Eighth Amendment cases. Indeed, this Term the
Court provided additional fodder for this understanding in two
qualified immunity decisions handed down on the same day, which
together shared more in common with the Court’s pre-Taylor
decisional trajectory than with Taylor: Both were per curiam summary
orders, both reversed lower court denials of qualified immunity, both
involved Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, and both repeated
the admonishment that such claims require special attention to factual
specificity in determining whether the law was clearly established.141
Given the fertile ground in lower courts for understanding qualified
immunity to be right-specific in practice if not in theory, these
decisions—and especially the contrast between Taylor and the Fourth
Amendment decisions that followed it—might further entrench
disparities in how clearly-established-law analysis is conducted in
such as those involving excessive force, where analogies to prior cases supposedly play a stronger
role”).
139. Taylor and Hope both involved conditions-of-confinement claims requiring proof of
officials’ “deliberate indifference” to serious harms, while McCoy concerned an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim requiring a showing that force was used “maliciously and
sadistically.” Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per curiam) (citing Taylor v. Stevens, 946
F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019), vacated sub nom. Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 54); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 738 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503, U.S. 1, 8 (1992)); McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d
226, 230 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 1364 (2021).
140. See McCoy, 950 F.3d at 230 (stating that core inquiry for McCoy’s claim was “whether force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm”) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7); Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d at 217 (stating that
for conditions-of-confinement claim “the prisoner must show ‘that the official possessed a
subjectively culpable state of mind in that he exhibited deliberate indifference’ to the risk of
harm” (quoting Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2019))); see also Dean, 984 F.3d at
310 (stating that when an “officer acts with a culpable state of mind . . . “he ‘reasonably should
know’ that he is violating the law” (internal citation omitted)).
141. See City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11–12 (2021) (per curiam); Rivas-Villegas v.
Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7–8 (2021) (per curiam); see also text accompanying notes 52—79
(describing post-Hope trajectory of Supreme Court’s qualified immunity caselaw).
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Fourth Amendment claims as compared to Eighth Amendment claims
and other contexts (such as Equal Protection and Substantive Due
Process) in which a defendant’s state of mind is relevant.142
A shift of this sort would be a mixed bag for critics of qualified
immunity. On the one hand, little change would be seen in qualified
immunity’s most controversial applications, particularly its impact on
the viability of Fourth Amendment excessive force claims and the
concomitant insulation of police from civil liability for use of excessive
force.143 On the other hand, loosening the clearly-established-law
shackles on courts evaluating Eighth Amendment claims, for example,
could meaningfully address what some have characterized as
“unqualified impunity” for abuse of and poor living conditions for
prisoners.144
It is possible, however, that entrenchment of Fourth Amendment
exceptionalism in qualified immunity is an unduly constrained view of
what the Court meant to convey in Taylor or how lower courts will read
it. At least some lower courts appear to have taken Taylor as blessing
clearly-established-law analysis done at a higher level of generality
than its prior precedents had suggested, regardless of the right at
issue.145 If this view takes hold, more decisions on qualified immunity
might sound like the district court opinion in Ortiz v. New Mexico, a
case involving alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment by prison
guard supervisors who did not intervene to prevent ongoing rape of a
prisoner.146 The court rejected the defendants’ factually laden attempt

142. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998) (requiring proof of intent to
harm to make out Substantive Due Process violation stemming from police high speed chase);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that proof of Equal Protection violation
requires proof of discriminatory purpose).
143. See Andrew Chung et al., Shielded: For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protections,
REUTERS (May 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-policeimmunity-scotus (summarizing an analysis of 252 appellate cases between 2015 and 2019 that
demonstrated federal courts are increasingly ruling in favor of officers in excessive force cases
and arguing that it is a result of recent Court decisions regarding qualified immunity).
144. David M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified Impunity in Prison,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2021, 2023 (2018) (identifying qualified immunity as part of the
constellation of factors creating “practical immunity” and “unqualified impunity” for prison
officials).
145. See Moderwell v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 997 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting Taylor and citing
Professor Joanna Schwartz for the proposition that “[t]he Court’s decision in Taylor sends the
signal to lower courts that they can deny qualified immunity without a prior case on point.”
(quoting Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, supra note 4, at 351)); Ortiz v. State of
New Mexico, No. CIV 18-0028 JB/LF, 2021 WL 3115577, at *75 (D.N.M. Jul. 22, 2021) (“Taylor
clarifies that it is no longer the case that an almost-identical case must exist.”).
146. Ortiz, 2021 WL 3115577, at *100.
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to distinguish prior decisions as not involving their precise conduct:
“listening to telephone conversations and reading letters,” and
“mistakenly believ[ing] a relationship between an inmate and prison
guard is consensual, yet prohibited by prison policy and state law, and,
as a result, fail[ing] to intervene immediately because they are waiting
to intercept a drug drop.”147 Rather, it was sufficient to deny qualified
immunity that, generally speaking, “[t]he Tenth Circuit long has held
that it is clearly established that sexual abuse of prisoners by prison
guards violates the Eighth Amendment.”148
Notably, the Court’s post-Taylor qualified immunity grants, while
more resonant with pre-Taylor solicitude toward immunity than with
Taylor’s more critical tone, do not clearly foreclose the possibility that
the Court is signaling a relaxing of its demands for factual particularity
in clearly-established-law analysis “across the board.”149 While the
decisions quoted the Court’s stringent pre-Taylor characterizations of
the clearly-established-law inquiry, both reversed lower courts for
relying on precedents that involved arguably materially different facts.
In Bond, the decedent was shot and killed by police in a residential
garage when he wielded a hammer in a manner that made it appear
that he might throw it at the officers.150 The Tenth Circuit determined
that it was clearly established that officers could not recklessly or
deliberately create a need to use force, and that a jury could find that
the officers did so here by cornering the decedent in the garage. The
Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the court’s reliance on a case in
which police ran toward, screamed at, and attempted to disarm a
suicidal man; in Bond, by contrast, the officers “engaged in a
conversation with [the decedent], followed him into a garage at a
distance of 6 to 10 feet, and did not yell until after he picked up a
hammer.”151 In Rivas-Villegas, the plaintiff alleged that the police had
used excessive force when they kneeled on his back for eight seconds
while removing a knife from his possession.152 The police did so in the
course of responding to a 911 call from the daughter of the plaintiff’s
girlfriend, reporting that the plaintiff was drunk, attempting to hurt her
and her mother, and was armed with a chainsaw.153 The Supreme Court
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644 (1986).
150. City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 10—11 (2021) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 11.
152. Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 6 (2021) (per curiam).
153. Id. at 6—7.
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held that the Ninth Circuit erred in relying on a case in which police,
responding to a noise complaint, knelt on a man who had possessed
only a sandwich in attempting to restrain and arrest him.154 The absence
of any knowledge by the police that violence had been threatened and
the lack of any weapon involved made the prior case “materially
distinguishable.”155 In short, neither Bond nor Rivas-Villegas obviously
stand for the proposition that a plaintiff must identify a nearlyfactually-identical case in order to overcome an immunity assertion.
If Taylor is in fact a signal of the Court’s openness to relaxing the
demands of the clearly-established-law analysis, it is worth observing
that lowering the threshold for factual particularity in prior precedents
is only one of several mechanisms at lower courts’ disposal for taking
that signal on board. This is because, although the Supreme Court has
been assiduous in its attention to how generally or specifically the
contours of a right are described for clearly-established-law analysis, it
has devoted almost no attention to other details of how the analysis
should be conducted—and thereby allowed substantial variation to
develop among the circuits. One such detail is the question of what
legal sources “count” for purposes of deciding whether a right is clearly
established.156 Lower courts have differed, for example, in their answer
to the question of whether the decisions of state courts or federal
district courts factor in the clearly established law analysis.157 Also a
matter of debate among the circuits is whether non-legal sources, such
as departmental training or policies, can properly be consulted as a
source of what makes an official’s legal obligations “clear.”158 So too
154. Id. at 8—9.
155. Id. at 8.
156. The Court has gestured at this issue but never squarely addressed it. In several recent cases
the Court has indicated that it might favor the strict view that only Supreme Court decisions
“count” for purposes of clearly established law, when it has stated that it “[a]ssum[ed] for the sake
of argument that a controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established federal law.”
Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014) (emphasis added). In Hope, the majority pointed to
non-judicial sources in conducting the clearly-established-law analysis, but the Court has never
expressly blessed such a practice (and language like that quoted in Carman suggests it might not).
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741–42 (2002) (holding law clearly established “in light of
binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, an Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC)
regulation, and a DOJ report informing the ADOC of the constitutional infirmity in its use of the
hitching post”).
157. Compare Carollo v. Boria, 833 F.3d 1322, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a case on point
from Supreme Court, circuit, or state’s highest court is required to clearly establish law), with
Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2021) (stating that clearly-established
inquiry looks to Supreme Court precedent, circuit precedent, out-of-circuit cases, and “district
court cases, from within the Third Circuit or elsewhere”).
158. See id. Compare Vazquez v. Cnty. of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020) (considering
internal policies, training, and PREA standards as part of the totality of sources establishing
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are lower courts divided over whether a circuit split on a legal question
can unclarify otherwise clear in-circuit law on the matter.159 These open
questions have tremendous significance for qualified immunity’s
effects. The range of sources available to plaintiffs and the possibility
for one circuit to move out of step with others to clearly establish law
has direct bearing on the ease with which plaintiffs may overcome the
defense. If Taylor is taken as a nudge to replace the hunt for factual
identicality with re-centering fair notice, lower courts might be
prompted to be more ecumenical in their consideration of sources of
clearly established law, or less quick to accept defense claims of
uncertainty based on out-of-circuit cases. Perhaps Taylor even reflects
a willingness by the Court to bless such approaches, or at least to
provide clearer guidance on these matters. Only time will tell.
C. Beyond Clearly Established Law
There is a final possibility for a changed doctrinal landscape postthat plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment protection against sexual voyeurism by detention facility
staff was clearly established), J W ex rel. Williams v. Birmingham Board of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248,
1263 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that it was not clearly established that SROs who sprayed
students with pepper spray and then took virtually no steps to decontaminate them violated the
Fourth Amendment and that “[f]or purposes of qualified immunity, it is not insignificant that
the methods used by the SROs—passage of time, exposure to fresh air, and evaluation by
paramedics—were at least partially consistent with their training and, at least to some degree,
with the instructions provided by . . . the manufacturer of [the pepper spray]”), Maye v. Klee,
915 F.3d 1076, 1087 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that the combination of prison policy and a court
order put defendants on notice that preventing a Muslim prisoner from attending Eid violated
First and Fourteenth Amendments), and Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 546 (4th
Cir. 2017) (holding that the court’s conclusion that law was clearly established was “‘buttressed
by’ the South Carolina Department of Correction’s internal policies” (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at
744))), with Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1015 (10th Cir. 2021) (“[J]udicial decisions are the
only valid interpretive source of the content of clearly established law, and, consequently,
whatever training the officers received concerning the nature of Mr. Frasier’s First Amendment
rights was irrelevant to the clearly-established-law inquiry.”), and Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541,
553 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that departmental policies could not render constitutional violation
clear because “[i]t must have been clearly established that the conduct at issue violates the
Constitution, not internal policies”).
159. Compare Rivero v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 316 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
circuit split does not mean law was not clear in Ninth Circuit), with T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632,
639–40 (6th Cir. 2014) (“By June 2009, a reasonable official could have consulted the numerous
Supreme Court opinions cited above, or the more recent opinions of our sister circuits, and, in
objective good faith, concluded that [Sixth Circuit precedent] was no longer good law.”), and
Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Even if our court had decided that strip
searches of prison visitors were unconstitutional in the absence of reasonable suspicion, there
might be enough doubt about the soundness of the decision, whether in light of decisions by
other circuits before or after our decision or of intimations in Supreme Court decisions not
squarely on point that our view might be erroneous, to justify the state in believing that the
plaintiff’s right was not yet ‘clearly established’ within the meaning of the cases on immunity.”
(quoting Santamorena v. Ga. Mil. Coll., 147 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1998))).
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Taylor, one that takes a broader view of the magnitude and impact the
signal that the Court’s recent actions may be sending.160 Particularly
when viewed alongside McCoy and against the backdrop of its earlier
refusal to revisit qualified immunity wholesale, the Court may be
broadcasting a more general openness to rolling back qualified
immunity’s excesses through various means of doctrinal and
procedural fine-tuning rather than (or in addition to) simply
recalibrating the clearly-established-law test. Though often flying
below the radar of qualified immunity commentary, rules governing the
timing of pre-discovery motions, collateral order doctrine, and the
sequencing of qualified immunity analysis, among others, can
significantly influence the impact qualified immunity has on civil rights
litigation.161 Moreover, in large part because the Supreme Court’s
supervision of qualified immunity doctrine has focused so heavily on
the clearly-established-law test, these rules exhibit significant variation
among the circuits. Lower federal courts receptive to a signal to reign
in qualified immunity (or practitioners inviting them to be so) might
accomplish some mitigation of qualified immunity’s bite by attending
to these rules. Increased percolation on these procedural questions
might even prompt the Supreme Court to step in to resolve existing
circuit splits—maybe even in a manner that blesses rules that are less
solicitous toward immunity claims.162
One important example of this procedural heterogeneity is lower
courts’ diverging degrees of openness to 12(b)(6) dismissals on
qualified immunity grounds. The Supreme Court has, since announcing
contemporary qualified immunity doctrine in Harlow, directed that an
immunity defense should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage of
160. The view sketched here is broad in the sense that it suggests Taylor may have implications
beyond the specific doctrinal confines of clearly-established-law analysis, but it is nevertheless
consistent with the view that the Court tends toward incrementalism, that, in the words of
Katherine Mims Crocker, it “frequently moves forward with the smallest of steps.” Crocker,
supra note 22, at 13; see also Schwartz, Police Misconduct, supra note 79 (“This may be how the
Supreme Court finally takes action on qualified immunity—not with a sweeping, landmark
decision, but with a subtle message, heard by civil-rights lawyers and judges who are listening,
that it is stepping back from its most robust depictions of qualified immunity’s power.”).
161. Aaron Nielson and Chris Walker have examined the last of these at length. See generally
Nielson & Walker, New Qualified Immunity, supra note 1. The Supreme Court itself has
recognized the potential for general procedural tools to be pressed into service for the opposite
goal–a shoring up of immunity’s protections. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597—601
(1998) (discussing “existing procedures available to federal trial judges” enabling them to
“exercise . . . discretion in a way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense”).
162. See Nielson & Walker, Qualified Defense, supra note 1, at 1884—85 (calling on Supreme
Court to “continue to refine its procedural approach to qualified immunity,” in particular
reexamining procedures governing the ordering of qualified immunity analysis).
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litigation.”163 This would suggest that dismissal on the pleadings is
frequently warranted. Paired with the increasingly factually
particularized showing that is required to demonstrate that a
constitutional right was clearly established, however, the prospect of
pre-discovery dismissal is perilous for civil rights plaintiffs, who
frequently lack relevant, particularized information that is in the
control of defendants.164 There is good reason, then, to suspect that
solicitude to qualified-immunity-based dismissals on the pleadings
would operate to end or deter suits.165 The Second and Sixth Circuits
mitigate this effect by expressly adopting a presumption against
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.166 The Second Circuit has explained that such a presumption is
necessary to guard against qualified immunity effecting a “heightened
pleading standard” for civil rights plaintiffs who would otherwise be
required to anticipate a defense in their complaint.167 By contrast, the
Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that § 1983 plaintiffs must plead “facts
sufficient to overcome a potential qualified immunity defense” in the
complaint, and are entitled to discovery only if their initial pleadings
allege both constitutional violations and that the defendants’ conduct

163. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (“[W]e have emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be
resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.”).
164. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 498 (1989)
(observing that civil rights claimants “rarely will possess or be able to obtain information
pertinent to their cases” and that “in numerous civil rights suits, considerable information
important to the factual preparation of complaints that appear specific will be in the records or
minds of government or corporate defendants and cannot be secured before these pleadings
must be filed, becoming available only during discovery”).
165. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW. L. REV. 1101,
1130–31 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects] (stating that civil
rights attorneys report that qualified immunity plays a role in their decision about whether to
take a case).
166. See Moderwell v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 997 F. 3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 2021) (discussing rule
followed in circuit that “[a]lthough a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity is a
threshold question to be resolved at the earliest possible point, that point is usually summary
judgment and not dismissal under Rule 12” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Marvaso v.
Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[G]ranting qualified immunity at the motion to
dismiss stage is usually disfavored.”); Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 111 (2d
Cir. 2020) (stating presumption against 12(b)(6) dismissal on qualified immunity grounds
because “[o]therwise, plaintiffs alleging a violation of their constitutional rights would face a
heightened pleading standard under which they must plead not only facts sufficient to make out
their claim but also additional facts to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity. . . . Put another
way, advancing qualified immunity as grounds for a motion to dismiss is almost always a
procedural mismatch”).
167. Chamberlain, 960 F.3d at 111.
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violated clearly established law.168
Though this circuit split involves a “purely” procedural rule about
whether dismissal on the pleadings is favored or disfavored, it likely
affects the degree of influence that qualified immunity doctrine exerts
over the availability of civil remedies. Moreover, on the present
challenge of discerning Taylor’s influence over qualified immunity
rules, it bears emphasizing that the stage of litigation at which a
qualified immunity defense may be asserted has direct bearing on the
height of the clearly-established-law hurdle, even holding constant the
degree of particularity required in defining the right at issue. That is to
say, two courts applying identical clearly-established-law tests—one
that could lead to dismissal prior to discovery and the other that
permits dismissal only after access to discovery—present plaintiffs with
different odds of success. Thus, if Taylor is taken as a signal that the
Court is open to softening the clearly-established-law test, it might well
endorse a new rule: the “earliest possible stage of litigation” at which
qualified immunity may be decided is subsequent to discovery.
The circuits also part company in their comparative solicitude
toward interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials. The
Supreme Court has held that denials of qualified immunity fall within
the exceptional category of “collateral orders” that can be immediately
appealed despite the absence of a final order in the case.169 In Behrens
v. Pelletier, the Court rejected restrictions that lower courts had placed
on the number and timing of such interlocutory appeals by defendants
asserting qualified immunity at successive stages of litigation—say, in a
motion to dismiss and again on a motion for summary judgment.170 As
a consequence, defendants enjoy multiple bites at the appellate apple,

168. See Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversing district court grant of
discovery on qualified immunity absent determination that complaint pleaded specific facts that
overcame defense); Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012) (reversing district court
that ruled “that it was ‘premature to address the defendant’s assertions of qualified immunity
before discovery has taken place,’” because “that is precisely the point of qualified immunity: to
protect public officials from expensive, intrusive discovery until and unless the requisite showing
overcoming immunity is made.”); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1989)
(announcing requirement that complaint overcome immunity defense); see also Westfall v.
Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 542 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Brown and dismissing on qualified immunity
grounds at 12(b)(6)).
169. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985). For discussion and critique of the
Court’s doctrine in this area, see generally Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified
Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 169 (2019).
170. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996) (holding improper an order dismissing a
defendant’s interlocutory appeal asserting qualified immunity, which was filed after the
defendant unsuccessfully appealed following an earlier stage in the litigation).
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litigation is more protracted and expensive, plaintiffs’ lawyers must be
able to handle both trial and appellate work, and, cumulatively, civil
rights cases become less attractive to plaintiffs’-side lawyers in the first
place.171
In Johnson v. Jones, the Supreme Court aimed to limit the impact
of immediate appealability by instructing the circuits that their
jurisdiction to hear immediate appeals of qualified immunity is limited
to “abstract questions of law,” and does not extend to appeals of district
court determinations that genuine disputes of fact preclude dismissal.172
In Johnson’s aftermath, however, the lower federal courts have
continued to differ in their approaches to the scope of appellate
jurisdiction over appeals of qualified immunity denials. Some treat
Johnson as confined to its facts and exercise jurisdiction over appeals
in any case except the rare instance where the defendants’ appeal is
premised on disputed evidence that they had no involvement in the
alleged constitutional violation.173 Others, like the Tenth Circuit, restrict
appellate courts from exercising jurisdiction over any redetermination
of what facts a reasonable jury could accept, and permit only appellate
reassessment of whether the facts credited by the district court
overcome qualified immunity.174 Finally, a small number of circuits have
implemented specific procedural mechanisms to discourage
inappropriate interlocutory appeal. For example, courts in the Sixth
Circuit have sanctioned lawyers for frivolous invocations of appellate
jurisdiction, and others have implemented procedures for trial courts
to certify appeals as frivolous.175 Such procedures operate on the
171. See Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, supra note 165 at 1121–23 (relaying
attorney perspectives on how defense counsel strategically use qualified immunity to
significantly burden plaintiff’s attorneys’ time and resources, so as to “‘beat down the plaintiff’s
counsel,’ and make their lives ‘somewhat miserable.’”); Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified
Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 100 (1997) (discussing anecdotal evidence that interlocutory appeals generate
substantial delay in civil rights cases and “that defendants use the qualified immunity
interlocutory appeal process to protract litigation ‘that would otherwise be tried or settled
relatively quickly.’” (quoting Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the
Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (1990)).
172. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995).
173. See, e.g., Amons v. Tindall, No. 20-16351, 2021 WL 3015107, at *3 (9th Cir. July 15, 2021)
(holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s qualified immunity appeal as it
was a “legal issue”); see also Estate of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 741 (9th Cir. 2021)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (expressing view that this interpretation is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s post-Johnson cases).
174. Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2016).
175. See, e.g., Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that “[s]hould the
district court find that the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity is frivolous or has been
waived, the district court may certify . . . that defendants have forfeited their right to pretrial
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margins to discourage lawyers from filing interlocutory appeals when
the legal justification for doing so is a close call, and thereby provide
some assurance to plaintiffs that the value of a strong case on the merits
will not be diminished by the resource-depleting effects of protracted
appellate litigation.176
If Taylor is taken as a signal that the Court is broadly open to
recalibrating the balance of protections for plaintiffs and defendants in
civil rights claims, it could prompt embrace of a more restrictive
approach to interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials. We
may then have the opportunity to see whether the Court is inclined to
settle the diversity of interlocutory appeal approaches among the
circuits; Taylor could predict that it would do so in a manner that
restricts defensive interlocutory appellate usage.177
A final example of qualified immunity procedural variation that
could be leveraged to mitigate distortions created by the defense
involves the sequencing of the clearly-established-law inquiry—or,
more precisely, whether courts adjudicating motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds reach the merits of
the constitutional claim before determining whether the law governing
it was clearly established when the defendants acted. The consequence
of not doing so is perhaps obvious: consistently declining to reach the
constitutional merits, and instead resolving qualified immunity
assertions simply by concluding that (whatever the law means
currently) it was not previously clearly established perpetuates the lack
of clarity in the law. The effect is potentially deleterious from the
standpoint of law development, and presents a Catch-22 for plaintiffs

appeal, and may proceed with trial.”); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1990)
(analyzing a process by which district courts may retain jurisdiction of cases in which a
defendant frivolously filed a notice of appeal asserting qualified immunity); Apostol v. Gallion,
870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989) (adopting a certification process for baseless notices of
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity rulings, whereby “a district court may certify to the
court of appeals that the appeal is frivolous and get on with the trial”). But see Rivera-Torres v.
Ortiz Velez, 341 F.3d 86, 95, 96 (1st Cir. 2003) (“We have never adopted the Apostol
certification procedure in this circuit. Although appellants urge us to do so here in the hopes of
adding fuel to their trial nullity argument, we decline their invitation.”).
176. See Chen, supra note 171, at 100 (noting that forcing defendants to bear the costs of
qualified immunity defenses in pre-trial litigation would encourage them to do so only when the
benefits outweigh the costs; i.e., when the defense is strong).
177. At least one circuit court judge has recently issued a “plea” to the Supreme Court to “tell
us clearly, in an appropriate case, whether and in what circumstances an interlocutory appeal
may be taken when the district court, viewing disputed evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, has denied a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity”). Est. of
Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 742 (9th Cir. 2021) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)).
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who remain, by dint of the manner in which qualified immunity is
analyzed, bereft of the legal precedent required for overcoming the
defense. Indeed, there was a brief period of time when the Supreme
Court required lower courts to analyze qualified immunity in a
particular order: constitutional merits first, clearly-established-law (if
necessary) second.178 Less than a decade after mandating that
approach, the Court reversed course. Since Pearson v. Calahan, lower
courts have been free to skip the merits of the constitutional claim, and
are encouraged to do so by language in Pearson. Interestingly,
empirical work by Aaron Nielson and Chris Walker has revealed
variations among the circuits in their tendencies to reach, or not reach,
the constitutional merits, creating the perhaps concerning potential for
asymmetrical law development across circuits.179 Nielson and Walker,
among others, have called for lower courts and the Supreme Court to
ameliorate these concerns, including by, for example, adopting a
requirement that courts “give reasons for exercising (or not) their
Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions,” and to “speak
critically of using discretion in strategic ways.”180 Taylor could signal
that the Supreme Court is prepared to act upon, or bless lower courts’
acting upon, such calls.
The lessons of this subpart are descriptive, predictive, and tactical.
Descriptively, the preceding account highlights the procedural
landscape in which qualified immunity is litigated, and the degree to
which that landscape calibrates the stringency of qualified immunity.181
Without carefully examining the work of lower federal courts, and
without attending to questions beyond application of the clearlyestablished-law standard itself, observers will miss the diversity of that
terrain, and mischaracterize qualified immunity doctrine as more
homogenous in content and effect than it is in reality. Sharpening the
lens to see this procedural diversity then suggests, as a matter of
prediction, that Taylor could kick off procedural recalibration that
extends beyond simply the contours of clearly established law. Of
course, law reform does not occur spontaneously. Thus, a final strategic

178. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201.
179. Nielson & Walker, New Qualified Immunity, supra note 1, at 39—42.
180. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L. REV. 55,
119—21 (2016).
181. Cf. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, supra note 23, at 1554 (stating that including
variation among courts regarding “rules governing pleadings, discovery, summary judgment
practice, interlocutory appeals, and the like” affects the overall “ecosystem” in which litigation
occurs).
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point is that advocates hoping to persuade courts to lessen qualified
immunity’s sting should urge courts to adopt procedures to that end.
Even for advocates pushing for reform of the doctrine in other arenas
(e.g., legislative), it is well to recall that procedural tinkering short of
abolition or even piecemeal substantive reform can play a useful (and
perhaps less politically fraught) role.
CONCLUSION
Despite increasingly broad-based discontent with the Supreme
Court’s qualified immunity doctrine, the Court has, for the present
moment, declined to announce a dramatic reversal of course from the
highly protective qualified immunity regime it has erected. But the
Court’s recent decision in Taylor v. Riojas was a tonal reversal if
nothing else. In breathing new life into a seemingly moribund
conception of clearly established law as existing in the absence of
factually analogous precedent, the decision raises the possibility that
judicial reform of qualified immunity might yet be afoot. This Article
has argued that the plausibility and particularity of that possibility
remains far from clear. Indeed, the Court’s two more recent qualified
immunity pronouncements might to put to rest any speculation that
Taylor portends radical reconfiguring of the clearly-established-law
test. But equally importantly, this Article has argued that the likely
meaning and strength of the Court’s jurisprudential signaling can only
be assessed against the backdrop of the diverse qualified immunity
jurisprudence of the lower federal courts that will apply the Court’s
decision. Doing so yields no easy or certain predictions about the future
of qualified immunity, but it does illuminate the doctrine’s hybridity,
and elevates qualified immunity as an important space for scholars
interested in the jurisprudential interaction of the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts. In the meantime, and as long as neither the Court
nor Congress acts to eliminate or fundamentally reshape qualified
immunity, lawyers and jurists with an eye toward mitigating qualified
immunity’s harshest effects might capitalize on and further push
forward this doctrinal variation.

